THE LOW American national saving rate has long been a serious concern to economic policymakers. Increasing national saving and investment was a principal objective of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and of the supply-side economic policies that accompanied it. Yet the national saving rate, at least as measured in the National Income and Product Accounts, has declined sharply during the 1980s. Over the past five years, national saving has averaged only 2.3 percent of full-employment GNP, compared with 7.4 percent during 1960-80. In 1986, American net national saving was below 2 percent of GNP, less than half the rate in Britain, less than 30 percent of the rate in France and Germany, and only 10 percent of the rate in Japan.
been financed by international capital flows. If national saving remains low, either these capital flows, with the attendant dislocations in the economy's traded goods sector, will continue, or investment will drop off precipitously. What finally happens will depend in large part on the response of foreign investors and governments to chronic capital outflows. Neither outcome would improve American international competitiveness.
This report examines several issues raised by the currently low American national saving rate. Are the declines in national saving real, or are they instead the result of faulty measurement that ignores the huge capital gains generated in the stock market from 1982 to the fall of 1987? Does recent experience contradict the Ricardian equivalence idea that government deficits call forth increased private saving or the supplyside idea that tax incentives can spur private saving? What forces lie behind the apparent secular downtrend in private saving? To what extent can capital flows from abroad substitute for domestic saving?
We conclude that the low national saving rate during the 1980s cannot be attributed to measurement problems. It is traceable to a combination of federal deficits and a continuation of a long-term downward trend in private and personal saving. Private saving would probably have been still lower during the 1980s if the federal government had not encouraged saving with new tax incentives. However, the most reliable way for the federal government to increase national saving is to reduce its own borrowing. Without an increase in national saving, and given the increasing reluctance of foreign investors to hold American assets, it is unlikely that even current levels of investment can be maintained. Table 1 presents saving data from the National Income and Product Accounts, measured on both a standard and an inflation-adjusted basis. The inflation adjustment is necessary because in an inflationary environment interest received (or paid) reflects in part compensation for the erosion in the value of nominal assets and so is not properly treated as income. 1 The table also presents measures of the ratio of private role for government deficits in accounting for the low level of national saving. It seems fair to conclude that in an arithmetic sense the low national saving rate in the 1980s is a reflection of declines in both public and private saving.
Trends in Saving

National Saving and the Ricardian Equivalence Proposition
The premise that national saving can be analyzed fruitfully as the sum of independent private and public components has been challenged by in taxes that will be necessary to repay the debt, and so will raise their saving. Private saving will rise to offset the decline in government saving, leaving national saving unaffected.
The Ricardian view may be put in a different way: government bonds are not a form of wealth. While government bonds represent an asset to those who hold them, they represent an exactly offsetting liability to the taxpayers who will ultimately redeem them. Hence deficit policies that increase the outstanding stock of government debt do not increase total spending, a conclusion that contrasts sharply with Keynesian conceptions of the effects of fiscal policies. Traditionally, Keynesians have debated the extent to which increases in demand caused by government tax cuts are crowded out. The Ricardian position is that crowding out takes place before the fact. There is no initial increase in demand when the government cuts taxes.
The Ricardian equivalence proposition depends on two assumptions: that consumers smooth consumption over long periods of time and that they foresee the long-term implications of the government's budget constraint. The validity of both assumptions is open to question. There is substantial evidence that many families' consumption tracks their income extremely closely, and casual observation suggests that consumers rarely think about the tax increases that will be necessary to pay off a rising national debt when they make their consumption decisions.4 Ultimately, however, ajudgment about Ricardian equivalence must rest on empirical grounds. Empirical evaluation of Ricardian equivalence has been difficult because until recently there has been relatively little variation in federal deficits independent of wars, cyclical fluctuations, and inflation, each of which might be expected to have a systematic impact on national saving independent of the effect of the budget deficit. Recent federal deficits, though, are far larger than would be predicted on the basis of historical relationships between deficits and macroeconomic conditions, so they provide a natural testing ground for Ricardian equivalence.
The raw data in table 1 appear to refute decisively the Ricardian equivalence proposition. Increases in government deficits have been associated with decreases, not increases, in private saving. There is, however, always the possibility that the apparent refutation of Ricardian equivalence is spurious. Some independent development may have caused measured national saving to decline in recent years, creating a spurious correlation with the rise in budget deficits. Alternatively, the national income accounts may mismeasure national saving.
Perhaps the most plausible argument is that NIPA saving is an inappropriate measure because it ignores capital gains and losses on existing assets, which represent increases or decreases in wealth and so should be treated as positive or negative saving. The increase in the stock market between 1982 and the fall of 1987, for example, substantially increased measured household wealth but was not reflected in official statistics on saving. To examine the importance of such capital revaluations we used data from the Federal Reserve Board's National Balance Sheets to construct time series measures of the net worth of the household sector. Figure 2 plots the change in households' real net worth measured as a fraction of potential GNP. Because the series is extremely volatile, it is difficult to judge whether this measure of national saving is abnormally low in recent years. Robert Barro and other defenders of the Ricardian equivalence proposition have cited this difficulty as evidence that the data do not yet permit a firm judgment about the impact of deficits on national saving. ' However, simply looking at the average value of wealth saving in recent years does not provide a satisfactory test of whether wealth saving has been reduced by budget deficits. Logically, if the concept of saving is expanded to include the capital gains and losses associated with asset revaluations, any income measure should be expanded in the same way. This adjustment has important effects. By their nature, the capital gains and losses associated with asset revaluations are likely to be transitory since, in well-functioning markets, speculation would arbitrage away any large expected capital gains or losses. One would therefore expect that in periods when the stock market rose sharply, making transitory income positive, wealth saving would be large. The fact that wealth saving has not been abnormally high during the 1980s might then be evidence that budget deficits are depressing national saving.
To examine this possibility and the related possibility that the low rate of national saving reported in the national income accounts was caused by macroeconomic conditions rather than budget deficits, we estimated regressions relating both the NIPA and wealth saving measures to various macroeconomic variables during 1950-81 (table 2a) . The macroeconomic variables included the GNP gap expressed as a percentage of GNP, inflation rates, and the value of real capital gains and losses on the stock market and on the housing stock expressed as a fraction of GNP. A time trend was also included in the equations. We then used the results to forecast the national saving rate during 1982-86 (table 2b) . If the Ricardian equivalence proposition is correct and national saving in the 1980s has not been sharply reduced by budget deficits, it 5. See, for example, Robert J. Barro, "Ricardian Equivalence" (Harvard University, 1987). It is worth noting that the bulk of the volatility of the wealth series comes from extremely variable stock market wealth, and that the 1982-87 increases in such wealth are the chief explanation why the rate of wealth saving has not been notably low over this period. Results that are typical of the many equations that we estimated are reported in table 2a. All of the equations significantly overpredict national saving in the 1980s. The prediction errors are substantively significant in most cases and are frequently statistically significant when the official saving measure is examined. The errors are frequently on the order of several percentage points of GNP. In the case of the equations using the wealth saving concept, the errors are often much larger, reflecting the fact that previous stock market rallies, unlike the 1982-87 one, have been associated with high rates of national saving.6
The table also shows that, as theory would predict, saving responds differently to capital gains and losses than to other forms of income. In the equations that treat capital gains as a component of saving and income, the marginal propensity to save out of stock market gains is close to unity. This correlation suggests that there is little to be gained from including capital gains and losses in measuring saving. Finally, even before 1981, there is evidence of a long-term downward trend in national saving.
Whatever the theoretical merits of the Ricardian equivalence doctrine, these results refute it as an empirical proposition about U.S. budget deficits. It is therefore legitimate to ascribe a substantial part of the decline in national saving during the 1980s to budget deficits. But the increase in government deficits from 0.8 percent of GNP during 1976-80 to 2.8 percent of GNP during 1981-86 cannot possibly explain all of the simultaneous 3.8 percent drop in the national saving rate.
Private Saving in the 1980s
Because private saving does not appear to be tied to changes in government borrowing patterns, it is probably best measured relative to private income, which we define as the sum of disposable income and Table 3 presents estimates of the private saving rate thus measured, along with its personal and corporate components. In addition to the standard measures of personal and corporate saving, the data are reported with two adjustments. The rationale for the inflation adjustment, already noted, is that neutral changes in the inflation rate that do not affect real interest rates would otherwise have an impact on measured saving rates. The pension adjustment is necessary because the national income accounts treat all contributions to pension plans and income earned by pension plans as personal income. Benefits paid out by pension plans are not treated as a component of income, since doing so would be double counting in the same way as it would be double counting to treat withdrawals from bank accounts or proceeds from stock sales as a form of personal income. Such treatment is natural for defined-contribution plans, in which a worker directly owns a pension account that is invested at his discretion so that his pension contributions or reinvestments of pension income are just another form of saving. Most private pension plans, however, are of the defined-benefit, rather than defined-contribution, variety, in which employers commit to provide workers with a pension based primarily on final salary and years of service. The employers then fund the implied contractual liability as they see fit, and retired workers receive a stream of income that bears no necessary relationship to the past saving that the employer has undertaken to fund that liability. It therefore seems most appropriate to treat benefit payments from defined-benefit plans as disposable income and to regard pension contributions and investment income as the saving of employers rather than of pension beneficiaries.7 This treatment precisely parallels the NIPA treatment of state and local pensions and social security.8
The available data do not permit a precise adjustment for pension saving. Since 72 percent of pensions are of the defined-benefit type, we added 72 percent of pension benefits paid by private pensions to household saving and subtracted the same figure from corporate saving, and also switched 72 percent of contributions to pension funds and imputed interest earned on pension assets from personal saving to corporate saving.9
No matter how the measurement issues are resolved, private saving has trended downward over the past fifteen or twenty years after rising during the 1950s and early 1960s, although the downward trend is considerably more pronounced in the inflation-adjusted series than in the unadjusted series. On an inflation-adjusted basis, the private saving rate has fallen by more than one-third from its high in the early 1960s. When adjustments are made for inflation and pensions, the average personal saving rate over the past decade has actually been negative. Further, it appears that most of the decline in inflation-adjusted private saving can be traced to declining personal saving. Table 4a presents regression equations directed at the question of whether the recent course of private saving is aberrant or instead simply reflects the continuation of secular trends and the effects of recent macroeconomic conditions. We relate both inflation-adjusted and un- 8. This treatment has the well-known defect that the official measure of government saving does not reflect pension liabilities that the government incurs. In the same way, the treatment of defined-benefit plans contemplated here does not treat the pension liabilities incurred by corporations as an offset to their saving.
9. This figure comes from Bernheim and Shoven, "Pension Funding," p. 6, Judgments about the likely future course of private saving depend on one's beliefs about why it has trended downward. In this part of the paper, we briefly examine a number of possible explanations for declining saving. Since our interest is in secular rather than cyclical movements in saving, we do not try to fit econometric equations describing consumption or saving. Instead, our approach is informal. We begin by focusing on the primary motivations for saving: provision for old age, the possibility of "rainy days," the desire to purchase big-ticket items, and the desire to leave bequests. Then we examine possible connections between demographic changes and trends in the saving rate.
The most commonly adduced explanation for saving is the need to provide for old age. The celebrated life-cycle saving hypothesis holds that aggregate savings arise because the dissaving of the retired population is exceeded by the saving of the more numerous and prosperous young. 18 The level of saving will depend on the extent to which consumers expect that their income will fall late in life, which in turn will depend both on retirement behavior and on the income support available to the retired population. Table 5 presents data on changes since 1950 in the relative economic well-being of elderly Americans. Despite dramatic reductions in the labor-force-participation rate of married men over age sixty-five, from 37.1 percent in 1960 to 17.3 percent in 1986, and despite the aging of the elderly population, the income of the elderly has increased substantially relative to that of the rest of the population.'9 The income of the aged can increase even as they retire earlier because labor income accounts for about 15 percent of their income.20 Primarily responsible for the improvement in the well-being of the elderly has been the dramatic increase in social security benefits. The ratio of those benefits per aged adult to per capita disposable income has grown nearly 50 percent in the past twenty years. Social security has been especially effective in putting a floor under the income of the aged. As a consequence, the share of the elderly poor is now lower than the corresponding share of the remainder of the population.
It seems reasonable to expect that the current relative income of the elderly influences the perception of younger Americans about how much they need to save for retirement. The observed change of about 10 percentage points in the ratio of the median income of the elderly to the median income of the rest of the population could easily account for a significant part of the decline in private saving. It is noteworthy that rising private saving rates in the 1950s coincided with declines in the relative economic position of the elderly, while the turnaround in the relative income of the elderly preceded the downward trend in private saving rates that began in the mid-1960s. The current importance of this However, because the cost of health care has risen far faster than disposable income, the share of income that consumers devote to uninsured health care has not declined. As a consequence, it is unlikely that a reduction in the need to save for possible health outlays has contributed much to declines in the saving rate.
It may be, however, that improved disability and life insurance coverage has reduced the extent of precautionary saving. A final motivation for saving is provision for one's children. It is not clear how the incentive for this form of saving has changed. Reductions in birth rates have dramatically reduced the number of children for whom parents must save. It may also be that the great increase in the number and quality of public institutions of higher education has reduced saving. In addition, the widespread use of financial aid formulas that penalize accumulated saving may also have discouraged saving for children. We doubt, though, that these considerations have reduced saving rates much, particularly given that data from the 1972 Consumer Expenditure Survey reveal that married couples with children saved 20.5 percent of their income, compared with 25.3 percent for married couples without children. An alternative explanation for the decline in saving rates is that the changing age composition of the population might influence the aggregate saving rate. To examine this possibility table 9 reports adjustments to the saving rate, constructed by combining information on age-specific saving rates with information on the share of income going to different age groups. As table 10 indicates, there is considerable uncertainty about the age-specific pattern of saving rates. The uncertainty reflects large recall errors in the available microeconomic data, as well some conceptual differences between Consumer Expenditure Survey estimates of saving rates, which use a residual method, and Survey of Consumer Finances saving rates, which estimate saving from increases in asset stocks.
Regardless of which saving data are used, demographic changes do not appear to account for large variations in the saving rate, in large part because changes in the share of income received by different age groups are relatively modest. From 1968 to 1984, the largest change was the 5.7 percent drop in the share of income going to those aged forty-five to fiftyfour. More typically, changes were on the order of 2-3 percent. A different demographic explanation for the declining saving rate is that the rise of two-earner families has reduced saving rates by reducing the variability of family incomes. The fraction of married women in the labor force has risen sharply, from 30.5 percent in 1960 to 54.6 percent in 1986.24 It is difficult to test whether that change has led to reduced saving. One negative piece of evidence is that the 1972 Consumer Expenditure Survey indicates that married couples with both spouses working full time had a saving rate of 22.1 percent, compared with 18.6 percent for married couples with only one spouse working.
Quantifying the separate contributions of all these factors to the secular downward trend in private saving is impossible. Our judgment is that the improving relative economic fortunes of the elderly probably is the single most important cause of reduced saving. Improvements in insurance coverage and households' increased ability to take on debt to purchase durable goods have also been at work. We doubt that these trends are likely to be reversed in the near future, though ultimately the generosity of social security may have to decline. This suggests that 24 even if government deficits return to historically normal levels, the U.S. national saving rate will remain between 4 percent and 6 percent.
International Capital Flows and the Low National Saving Rate
We next consider the implications of maintaining a level of national saving that is low by both historical and international standards. The economic effects of a low saving rate depend critically on the international response to it. In textbook models of small open economies, the level of national saving has no impact on the level of national investment. Instead, decreased saving is translated dollar for dollar into international borrowing. In a closed economy, by contrast, reduced saving is directly translated into lower investment.
The huge U.S. current account deficit of recent years and the vast international capital market make it tempting to conclude that the openeconomy model is more appropriate for thinking about the effects of changes in U.S. national saving. However, consideration of the recent American experience, and of the international historical experience more generally, raises doubts that international capital flows can substitute for domestic saving on a long-term basis.
Compared with the vast international differences in national saving rates, the recent U.S. capital inflows of about 3 percent of GNP do not appear large. Nor do they appear large compared with the movements in capital that would be necessary to equalize international rates of return. With a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, having a capital share of 0.25 and a capital output ratio of 2, an increase in the capital stock equal to more than 20 percent of GNP is necessary to drive down the rate of return by I percentage point. And yet observed capital flows in the United States and the associated movements in the trade deficit have been associated with huge economic dislocations as the traded goods sector of the economy has lost competitiveness. It is doubtful that a trade deficit of the current size would be sustainable politically, even if it were sustainable economically.
The judgment that large-scale capital import is not viable as a longrun strategy is confirmed -by international experience. But there is a far more basic point. If IRAs serve as a saving incentive, they must do so by raising the after-tax rate of return. Yet, as Summers and Carroll correctly note, titanic increases in rates of return during the 1980s failed to raise private saving. This suggests that the response of saving to the rate of return may not even be positive, much less large. And if that is the case, providing a marginal incentive will do little good.
Summers and Carroll's list of causes of the declining saving rate gives two stars to the increased relative affluence of the elderly, which suggests a reduced need to save for old age. The argument here is eminently reasonable. But does it explain the facts? That depends on what facts we want to explain. It certainly cannot explain an abrupt drop in saving during the last year or two. It is a more promising explanation for any secular decline in saving that may exist. However, their table 5 shows that the biggest jump in social security benefits relative to disposable income came in the late 1950s, just before saving rates soared in the 1960s. Of course, there are lags. So I am not suggesting that we reject the explanation-only that we downgrade it to one star.
General Discussion
Thomas Juster agreed with Alan Blinder about the importance of distinguishing between hypotheses about the secular trend of the saving rate and those about the trend in recent years. He noted that previous revisions of the NIPA raised estimates of saving; the apparently low saving rate during the past few years may be higher once the NIPA are revised. Evidence of a secular decline would be a more serious matter. However, Juster questioned the appropriateness of Summers and Carroll's inflation adjustment to the personal saving rate, which appeared to be a major contributor to the secular decline. The nonadjusted series shows a decline injust the past few years. While agreeing that an inflation adjustment may be appropriate for the corporate sector, Juster argued that it is by no means clear that households base decisions on real rather than nominal interest rates.
A number of participants discussed the logic of the authors' pension adjustment. Juster noted that their approach, regarding contributions to defined-benefit pension plans as corporate rather than personal saving, assumes that households do not take into account their claim to future pension benefits in making their saving decisions. The size of this adjustment has grown over recent decades, thereby contributing to the apparent decline in household saving. While agreeing that households do not know the precise value of their accumulated pension benefits, he argued that they do know whether the benefits are vested and for how many years they have credit, and they make pretty good guesses about the fraction of their income to which they will be entitled upon retirement. Hence he believed it plausible that accumulated pension benefits affect household behavior. William Brainard agreed about the desirability of an adjustment to recognize the future obligations incurred by corporations and the balancing claims of households on future benefits. He argued that such claims are in effect annuities owned by households and noted that taking into account pension obligations incurred in a given year by corporations substantially changes the picture of corporate and household saving. James Poterba, while agreeing that the calculations made by the authors (similar to ones made in his own paper) leave out the accrual of pension benefits by households, noted that constructing an aggregate series reflecting the accrual would require a large number of arbitrary assumptions. Summers stressed that this issue does not affect conclusions about total private saving, but only the division of private saving between corporate and personal saving. Summers also argued that the logic of Brainard and others would seem to imply the accrual of social security benefits in income and saving, a procedure he believed most would agree is inappropriate.
Olivier Blanchard was not convinced by the authors' dismissal of Robert Barro's view that the low saving rate may be due to the increase in the market value of assets. He argued that Barro's view is consistent with standard consumption functions, such as the one in the MPS model, according to which consumption depends on both labor income and wealth. An increase in expected dividends is captured in an increase in wealth, which should therefore be associated with an increase in consumption and a decrease in measured saving. Blanchard suggested that it would be informative to know how well such consumption functions had performed in recent years and whether the income and wealth coefficients appeared to have changed.
Robert Hall disagreed with Blanchard' s, and the " standard, " view of the effects of stock market appreciation on consumption. Consumption functions like that in the MPS model typically assume that the coefficient on wealth is constant. However, some changes in wealth, for example those caused by a change in the discount rate, would not result in an increase in the consumption of a long-lived household. If the stock market appreciates, but the real return is proportionately lower, the coefficient on wealth times the value of wealth remains unchanged. In other words, Hall argued, the expected flow of dividends need not have changed even though the value of stocks has risen. With a long time horizon, consumption and dividends will be approximately equal.
A number of participants questioned various of the authors' explanations for the decline in the personal saving rate. James Duesenberry was skeptical that the increase in the affluence of the elderly would result in a lower saving rate. He noted that the increase in life expectancy may offset the higher incomes of the elderly. Although social security benefits are like an annuity, Duesenberry reasoned, to the extent that the elderly rely on other income sources, the need to save for a longer lifetime may outweigh the increased social security payments.
Poterba noted that changes in social security benefits are likely to have different effects upon the saving of various age groups. He questioned the authors' conclusion that the current relative well-being of the elderly is likely to reduce saving on the part of younger individuals. He believed that recent changes in social security benefits may encourage individuals who are near retirement to reduce their saving. In support of this view Henry Aaron cited public opinion polls that show that young people anticipate little or no return from the social security system. He agreed that lower saving rates for younger households are not likely to be the result of recent improvements in social security benefits. Summers discounted the validity of survey responses that suggest a lack of confidence in the social security system. In his view, individuals who observe that their parents enjoy a good retirement income from social security will be less inclined to save for their own retirement.
Juster, while suggesting that the evidence on saving rates across age groups is not conclusive, noted that the data suggest that the elderly may save more than any other age group. He believes that more careful analysis of the characteristics of saving at the microeconomic level, both across age groups and across time, will be necessary for understanding the reasons for changes in the overall saving rate.
Aaron argued that the relevant comparison for explaining the saving of the elderly is that between their current and prior economic status rather than that between the economic status of the aged and nonaged. 
